الملحق السادس
عدم جدوى الردّ العسكري
الملحق السادس
عدم جدوى الردّ العسكري
النظريات والآراء التي لا تؤيد الردّ العسكري، وتعدّد الشروط التي يجب أن تتوفّر له، والعقبات التي تقف في طريقه
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أسباب ترجّح استبعاد الرّد العسكري أو استبعاد التسرّع فيه
التأخّر في التوصل إلى تحديد هوية ومسؤولية الفاعلين
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“Acceptance of the need to justify any military reprisal…has one serious drawback….”
“From the point of view of both domestic public opinion and international politics, any military retaliatory action must be launched relatively soon after the act of terrorism that triggered it.”
“…a long time may pass before sufficiently clear proof is obtained concerning the identity of the perpetrators. The delay associated with applying highly protective criteria for accountability for terrorism may often exclude military reprisal as a countermeasure…”.
Heymann, p. 71, par.3.
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“These are significant problems, [1] for state sponsors of terrorism often do their best to conceal their involvement…[2] the actual perpetrators may spread false leads…. [3] Even when the evidence is clearest, as when unimpeachable intelligence sources implicate the sponsoring state, the would-be retaliator may be unwilling to reveal the sources of that unimpeachable evidence or even the evidence itself to anyone other than its closest allies”.
Heymann, p. 71, last par.
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“Even in this context, there is substantial debate as to whether self-defense can be used to justify a response to anything other than an armed incursion by identified troops into the defender’s territory. Some argue that only such incursions are clear enough acts to justify self-help: that in all other cases there is too likely to be a mistake about who is responsible for terrorism and too little urgency about resolving that matter to justify a form of military retaliation that may lead to escalation and war.”
Heymann, p. 70, par.3.
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Heymann, p. 75 (Original Source: Bruce Hoffman and Caleb Carr, “Who is Fighting Whom”, World Policy Journal, Vol. 14, No.1, Spring, 1997.
“There are many plausible reasons and a good deal of historic evidence to demonstrate that frequently a military response will not deter a state from sponsoring terrorism”
Heymann, p. 76.
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Heymann, p. 70, par.3.
“It is difficult to define and prove the level of sponsorship of terrorist acts that would warrant retaliation in self-defense…the responses of U.S. administrations suggest that the US would hold a country responsible for a terrorist act only if sufficient proof existed that the country’s own agents were assisting the attack”.
Heymann, p. 70, last par.
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“In what ways might deterrence... fail, and how likely is this state of affairs?
Consider the many possibilities. [1] The state sponsoring terrorism may lack the capacity to stop the terrorist group. [2] It may consider the actions necessary to stop the group more dangerous to the state safety than the retaliatory strike. [3] The administration of the sponsoring state may find that the retaliatory strikes have political benefits, for example, uniting the public behind it. It may decide to continue sponsoring terrorist behavior but more secretly.” “…[4] The message sent by the retaliating state may not be clear…. The state sponsoring the terrorist activity may regard that [retaliatory strike] as a ruse to cover other objectives of the retaliating state. [5] Even if the message is clear, the sponsoring state may react with hatred and aggression rather than fear and submission, perhaps understanding the confrontation as challenging its very autonomy rather than a particular policy…. [6] The strike may weaken internal political opposition to the main foreign policy direction, including hostility toward the retaliatory state, of the government. National pride is always a powerful incentive for a public.”
Heymann, pp. 73-74.
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“My point is not to prove that retaliation to deter state sponsorship of terrorism will generally fail. It is simply to recognize that even without considering the possibility of irrational responses, a variety of perfectly rational reasons may defeat the specific deterrence that justifies, politically and legally, retaliatory military strike. A decision to use a military response depends on more than the determination of the true responsibility for acts that are sometimes carefully hidden; on more than an assessment of the complicated moral question raised by the likelihood of hitting innocent targets; and on more than difficult calculations of international law and international support. It also depends on a judgment of the prospects of being successful in terms of specific deterrents. And that obviously requires an intricate understanding of the culture, needs, goals, and politics of the target of retaliation.
Heymann, p. 74, par.3.
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Heymann, p. XIII.
“A democratic nation wants life, liberty, unity as the products of its policies for dealing with terrorism, not just physical security. Focusing exclusively on a very popular desire for revenge- treating terrorism as if were nothing but a common crime- is likely to provide too little liberty and unity to be a sensible policy. Urged on us [the U.S.A.] by Israel’s Prime minister Netanyahu, this policy has not served his country well.”
Heymann, p. 153.
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